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Abstract 
 
In this paper we use a comparative perspective to explore the ways in which institutions and 
networks have influenced entrepreneurial development in Russia. We utilize Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data collected in 2001 and 2002 to investigate the effects 
of the weak institutional environment in Russia on entrepreneurship, comparing it first with 
all available GEM country samples and second, in more detail, with Brazil and Poland. Our 
results provide strong evidence that Russia’s institutional environment is important to explain 
its relatively low levels of entrepreneurship development, where the latter is measured in 
terms of both number of start-ups and of existing business owners. In addition, Russia’s 
business environment contributes to the relative advantage of entrepreneurial insiders (those 
already in business) to entrepreneurial outsiders (newcomers) in terms of new business start-
ups.   
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1. Executive Summary  
 
The work of both William Baumol (1990, 1993, 2005) and Douglass North (1990, 
1994, 1997, 2005) has highlighted the relationship between  the institutional environment and 
entrepreneurship development. In this paper, we explore this relationship empirically in 
Russia, relative to other transition and emerging economies. A number of studies have 
indicated the hostile nature of the business environment in Russia, though there is 
surprisingly little evidence about its impact on entrepreneurial behavior. We attempt to fill 
this knowledge gap by specifically testing two hypotheses regarding this relationship.  
   Drawing on the extensive body of literature highlighting different aspects of the 
institutional environment in Russia, our first part of hypothesis one stipulates that, due to 
these conditions, characterized for example by high levels of corruption and the weak rule of 
law, entrepreneurial entry levels will be low relative to countries with a stronger institutional 
framework.  In the second part of hypothesis one, we explore the effects of legal origin, 
namely the centralized planning system vs. other legal forms such as English and French. We 
investigate to what extent this institutional factor contributes to lower levels of 
entrepreneurship in all the formerly centrally planned countries, as well as in Russia.   
Our second hypothesis focuses on the possible influence of networks on 
entrepreneurship development in Russia. Networks, in the peculiarly Russian form of  ‘blat’, 
continue to be used to circumvent the inadequacy of the institutional environment. However, 
though ‘blat’ is a tool that can be utilized by entrepreneurs, it tends to be based on strong 
network ties and to be opportunistic in character and this results in its effectiveness being the 
greatest for the narrow circles of the Russian elite.  For non-elite individuals, the paucity of 
alternative  mechanisms for establishing strong and weak network ties that would assist in 
both overcoming bureaucratic barriers and providing the necessary resources (information, 
finance and labor) in a weak institutional environment seems to be a major impediment to 
business entry.  
For our analysis, we use the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor’s (GEM) dataset 
collected in 2001 and 2002. The findings from our empirical analysis of Russian 
entrepreneurs lead us to several key insights. Firstly, entrepreneurship levels in Russia are 
low not only when compared to similar relatively large emerging economies such as Poland 
and Brazil but also when compared to a number of other countries that have transitioned from 
a centrally planned economy to a free-market one. The strong ties between businesses and 
state administration in Russian economy also seems to provide greater opportunities for 
existing entrepreneurial insiders to develop new ventures rather than newcomers taking the 
plunge of establishing start-ups.  
 
 
2. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we explore the patterns of entrepreneurial development in Russia; a 
context where it can be argued that many of the preconditions for a workable free-market 
economy are lacking (see Desai, 2006).  Our approach builds on  Baumol (2005) and North 
(1990) in highlighting the impact of economy wide institutional incentives as well as 
institutional structures on entrepreneurial activity and development. This paper supplements 
the relatively sparse existing empirical literature on entrepreneurship development within 
weak institutional environments (Johnson et al. 1999, 2000; McMillan and Woodruff 1999, 
2000; Djankov et al. 2005, 2006). By using data on entrepreneurship in Russia collected as a 
part of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), we investigate the ways the Russian  
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context, with its institutional weaknesses and history of networks and ‘blat’
2, influence the 
characteristics of individuals embarking on entrepreneurial activities. We do this in a 
comparative way by contrasting entrepreneurial development in Russia with Poland and 
Brazil. Poland illustrates the case of  a country that has also switched from a centrally 
planned economic system to a free-market system while Brazil is comparable to Russia as 
another middle income country exhibiting similar levels of GDP per capita but lower level of 
corruption. Smallbone and Welter (2001) argue that family tradition was of particular 
importance in Poland, which permitted the continuation of small-scale private activities 
throughout the communist era. Russia of course, was under communist rule for much longer 
and lacked this tradition (Puffer and McCarthy 2001; see also: Szelenyi, 1988; Webster, 
1992)
3. 
As with the other centrally planned countries, Russia’s inherited ideology was not 
conducive for entrepreneurial development. In the Soviet period entrepreneurs were equated 
with ‘speculators’ and often deemed criminals for making a profit. The Soviet state was built 
on an ideology that stifled independent innovative culture and allowed for a punishment-
oriented ‘inspection culture’ to develop, where discretionary power of officials led to 
corruption and importance of networks
4. The economy was run bureaucratically and the 
concentration of reward on plan attainment suppressed the appetite for risk taking and instead 
bred habits of obedience and ‘playing it safe’ (Ellman, 1994). As a result, in North’s terms, 
the weakness of formal institution enforcement (e.g. commercial law) combined with the 
informal norms and values (negative attitudes towards entrepreneurship) to create an 
atmosphere that is less conducive to the development of new entrepreneurial firms. Many 
authors have pointed to some of the existing barriers to entrepreneurship in current day 
Russia such as the lack of property rights enforcement (Puffer and McCarthy 2001; Aidis and 
Adachi 2005) 
5, and the emergence of a ‘grabbing hand’ model of government intervention 
(see Shleifer and Vishny, 1999) which is characterized by corrupt behavior occurring in a 
disorganized way that leads to the personal enrichment of government officials, to the 
detriment of the rule of law and private business development (Frye and Shleifer, 1997). 
Shleifer and Treisman (2005) argue that Russia is not such an outlier and fulfils the 
characteristics of a middle-income country. Baumol  however might be persuaded to 
conclude that Russia does not fulfill the preconditions he set forth for the existence of a 
‘workable free-market economy’ (2005). Moreover, it is often argued that Russia has not 
been able to develop high levels of productive entrepreneurship with the formal institutional 
environment being identified as the main barrier to entrepreneurship development within its 
new institutional environment (Djankov and Murrell, 2002), though there is surprisingly little 
empirical evidence. We attempt to fill this gap by specifying and testing hypotheses about the 
                                                 
2 “ ‘By blat’ (po blatu) means ‘by acquitance’ (po znakomstvu) and would be used to mean ways of obtaining 
(dostat’) or arranging (ustroit’) something using connections” (Ledeneva, 2006, p. 213). 
3 Roberts and Zhou (2000) find that some former Soviet Union countries (now Commonwealth of Independent 
States) saw different entrepreneurial strategies than advanced reformers such as Hungary.  First, the former are 
more likely to start in trading and then diversify. Thus a ‘generic businessman, always trading, maybe opening a 
restaurant one year, a taxi business the next, then maybe buying a meat-processing plant…’ (ibid: 194). Second, 
entrepreneurs in former Soviet countries are more likely to pursue entrepreneurial careers as a part-time 
occupation while being employed elsewhere. Finally, while Central European firms mostly operate in the 
official economy, Russian entrepreneurs conduct a significant proportion of their business in the second 
economy. 
4 Puffer and McCarthy note that in Russia the environment was traditionally hostile towards entrepreneurship, 
even in the tsarist era when modest entrepreneurial activity was conducted primarily by minority ethnic groups 
(2001:29). 
5 However, when the government initiates such disputes as in the Yukos case, even the informal route for 
resolution becomes ineffective.   
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nature and determinants of entrepreneurship in Russia relative to other comparable emerging 
and transition economies, using a data set collected by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(GEM).  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section three we discuss the 
theoretical inspiration for our empirical analysis based on institutional theory. Section four 
presents a brief literature review that illustrates the specific Russian context and develops our 
hypotheses. The data used to test our hypotheses are discussed in the fifth section and the 
results are presented in the sixth, before conclusions are drawn in the seventh. 
 
3. Institutional theory and entrepreneurship development  
The work of William Baumol (1990, 1993, 2005) and Douglass North (1990, 1994, 
1997, 2005) provide the most significant theoretical insights about entrepreneurial 
development in differing institutional environments. According to North, entrepreneurs are 
the main agents of change. Organizations such as firms set up by entrepreneurs will adapt 
their activities and strategies molded to fit the opportunities and limitations provided through 
the formal and informal institutional framework. Though ideally, formal rules are designed to 
facilitate exchange reducing transaction costs, they are also likely to affect individuals or 
groups in different ways. Formal rules and institutions, since individuals create them in their 
own private interest, do not necessarily operate in the interest of social wellbeing (North 
1994).  
Baumol (1993) follows a similar logic but provides greater analysis of the types of 
entrepreneurship that can emerge under different institutional environments. Institutions are 
important as the structures that provide the incentives for different types of economic activity. 
In an environment where the benefits and rewards for rent-seeking activities outweigh their 
costs, unproductive entrepreneurship i.e. entrepreneurship that benefits the entrepreneur but 
not the economy will flourish. Similarly, if the benefits of engaging in illegal entrepreneurial 
activity outweigh their costs, entrepreneurs tend to be more inclined to engage in destructive 
entrepreneurship i.e. entrepreneurship that is detrimental for economic development. 
Conversely if  the incentives are for ‘productive’ entrepreneurship (contributing positively  to 
growth) then this form will predominate.  In each case entrepreneurs will weigh the 
incentives present in the environment both in the form of regulations (formal rules according 
to North) as well as in terms of the prevailing cultural values and norms (informal rules 
according to North). This does not mean that the same individual will engage in productive, 
unproductive or destructive entrepreneurship depending on the incentive structure; rather, 
different individuals will embark on entrepreneurial activities under different incentive 
structures.  
Both North and Baumol emphasize the role that the institutional environment plays in 
fostering and forming entrepreneurial development. The work of both suggests that in weak 
institutional environments (i.e. where the incentives for productive entrepreneurship are 
weak), productive entrepreneurship will be at low levels. This is the main issue that we will 
explore in our empirical analysis. 
 
 
4.  Hypotheses and Control Variables 
 
A considerable literature indicates that weak institutions, notably the quality of the 
commercial code, the strength of legal enforcement, administrative barriers, extra-legal 
payments and lack of market-supporting institutions, may represent a significant barrier to 
entrepreneurship (see e.g. McMillan and Woodruff (1999, 2002), Djankov et al (2004)). In a 
study comparing new firms in Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine, Johnson et al.  
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(2000) show that insecure property rights, in addition to weaknesses of macroeconomic 
stability and inadequate financing, inhibit the development of the private sector.  
These institutions are especially problematic in Russia, where the system is marred 
with inconsistencies and many Soviet regulatory documents are still in force. As a 
consequence it is not always clear which regulations apply in a specific case, creating 
confusion for regulators and the regulated community alike (OECD 2005). In fact, ‘No one 
really knows which laws and regulations are implemented and observed, although it is clear 
that many are not implemented at all, or only partially’ (ibid.). It is not surprising that under 
the current situation, ‘Russian entrepreneurs fear bureaucrats more than criminals’
6 
(Smolchenko 2005) and corruption is commonplace. Law enforcement is also rather 
arbitrary: according to Radaev, over 80 percent of Russian entrepreneurs have suffered from 
broken contracts (2002). An earlier study by Johnson et al. (1999) indicates that relational 
contracting (i.e. contracts informally enforced through networks) plays a significant role in 
the transition economies, especially in countries like Russia where the court systems are 
inadequate. Similarly, as McMillan and Woodruff (2002) argue, reputational incentives 
substitute for court enforcement of contracts. These factors can form further barriers to entry 
(Aidis and Adachi 2005).  These studies highlight the importance of a stable rule of law in 
terms of enforcement of property rights and a functioning court system for private business 
development.  Based on studies compiled by the World Bank, the institutional environment in 
Russia remains poor in terms of final percentile rank, even relative to the transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe, though some improvement has taken place 
(Kauffman, et al. 2005).  
As shown in Table 1, indicators measuring voice and accountability, political stability 
and regulatory quality have all deteriorated since 1998; the percentile rank for government 
effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption have improved but the rank remains 
strikingly low. 
 
 
Table 1: Governance Indicators for Russia in 1998 and 2004 compared 
Governance Indicator 
 
Year  Percentile Rank (0 – 100) 
Voice and Accountability  2004  25.7 
 1998  41.4 
Political Stability  2004  21.8 
 1998  23.6 
Government Effectiveness  2004  48.1 
 1998  23.5 
Regulatory Quality  2004  30.5 
 1998  31.5 
Rule of Law  2004  29.5 
 1998  22.7 
Control of Corruption  2004  29.1 
 1998  25.7 
Source: Kauffman et al. (2005) http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkzz2004/sc_chart.asp 
Key: Voice and Accountability measure political, civil and human rights; Political Stability measures the likelihood of 
violent treats to, or changes in, government including terrorism; Government Effectiveness measures the competence 
of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery; Regulatory Quality measures the incidence of market-
unfriendly policies; Rule of Law measures the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence; Control of Corruption measures the exercise of public power for private gain, 
including both petty and grand corruption and state capture. 
 
                                                 
6 Based on a survey carried out by OPORA in 2001 (A Russian NGO representing small and medium sized 
enterprises). See also OPORA (2005).  
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The level of corruption is also high in Russia. According to the Corruption 
Perceptions Index compiled by Transparency International, transition countries generally 
exhibit higher levels of corruption compared to most advanced western countries, however 
the highest corruption levels occur in the former Soviet region of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). Moreover, Russian entrepreneurs have also been found to be more 
corrupting than the population as a whole (Djankov et al. 2005), perhaps because they are 
more susceptible to extortion by the government officials. Recent evidence suggests that 
corruption is on the increase in Russia. The Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) indicates that in 2005 more than 39 percent of the respondents in 
Russia agreed that they have to make some irregular payments or gifts for activities related to 
customs, taxes, licenses, regulations and services frequently. The average percentage of 
corruption for transition countries as a whole was under 21 percent and decreasing. 
 Tanzi (1998) argues that corruption reflects the multidimentional impact of poor 
institutions and Djankov et al (2002) provide empirical evidence for this, showing that 
corruption reflects an inefficient, overregulated environment with officials endowed with 
discretionary power. Incidence of corruption may prevent businesses from growing above 
some threshold level, since otherwise  business owners may be expropriated by corrupt 
officials, especially the tax administration (Barkhatova, 2000; Aidis and Mickiewicz, 2006). 
Moreover, expectations of such behavior may discourage potential entrepreneurs from 
starting a business. In an environment of weak formal institutional enforcement and high 
corruption, business interactions based on trust are especially important. However, as Radaev 
(2005) notes, Russia bears the characteristics of a distrustful society since the formal rules 
and regulations are unpredictable and contradictory and reciprocal trust in business-to-
business relationships is low: as Radaev notes, ‘honesty does not pay’ (2005:114).   
To a degree, the explanation of Russia’s poor institutional environment relates to its 
long communist heritage,  which the country shares with the whole group of the post-Soviet 
economies. The work of La Porta et al. (1999) has addressed the relationship between legal 
origin and institutional development. According to La Porta et al. (1999) legal origin can be 
viewed as a proxy for the government’s proclivity to intervene in the economy and the stance 
of the law toward security of property rights. They developed five broad categories by which 
to classify different legal systems, according to their origins as English, French, German, 
Scandinavian and Socialist (post-Soviet).  In a related empirical analysis, Djankov et al. 
(2002) utilises La Porta’s classifications to demonstrate that countries of French, German and 
Socialist legal origin have more entry regulations than English legal origin countries, while 
countries of Scandinavian legal origin have about the same. In order to deepen our analysis of 
Russia’s institutional environment and entrepreneurship development, we incorporate La 
Porta et al.’s (1990) legal origin categories to investigate if Russia’s situation is unique vis-à-
vis other former socialist economies. In line with our discussion above, we hypothesize that 
the Soviet heritage shared with other countries is not alone sufficient to explain why Russia 
differs in terms of its level of entrepreneurship.  
Accordingly, we postulate that:  
 
Hypothesis 1a: Due to their weak institutional environments, entrepreneurial development 
will be lower in former Soviet-type economies than in other emerging markets at comparable 
levels of development.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: Levels of entrepreneurial activity will be even lower in Russia than in other 
former socialist economies in Central and Eastern Europe.  
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In the literature on developed western economies, networks are argued to  assist 
entrepreneurs in accessing the resources needed for business formation (Aldrich et al 1987). 
Thus, Johannisson  postulates that the ‘birth of a new venture’ is the ‘institutionalization of a 
part of the entrepreneur’s personal network into a venture’ (2000:37). Networks have been 
found to be important for access to resources (such as information, finance and labor) and to 
enhance the entrepreneur’s opportunity recognition capabilities (Hills et al 1997). Ardichvili 
et al (2003) identify social networks as an antecedent for entrepreneurial alertness that 
constitutes a necessary condition for opportunity recognition. Some scholars have argued that 
a cohesive or densely embedded network provides a competitive advantage for entrepreneurs 
(Coleman 1988, 1990; Walker et al 1997; Ahuja 2000), while others have suggested that 
sparsely connected networks full of ‘structural holes’ provide competitive advantage (Burt 
1992). For example, Singh et al (1999) have found that the size and number of weak ties in 
an entrepreneur’s social network were positively related to the number of new venture ideas 
and opportunities recognized. Moreover, network entrepreneurs were found to identify 
significantly more opportunities than solo entrepreneurs.  
In the Russian context, people  developed networked strategies, as a way to obtain 
scarce resources within the malfunctioning Soviet system, and these took the form of ‘blat’ 
(Ledeneva 2006). In  the transition period, however, blat has not been able to evolve into a 
substitute for the weak and malfunctioning market-based institutional environment. To the 
contrary, it has evolved into a sophisticated form of corruption available only to the elite (Hsu 
2005). The reason for blat’s shift from providing access to scarce resources for the masses to 
becoming a tool effective only for the elite is mainly attributed to two factors. Firstly, blat 
was never rooted in a moral system: even during the Soviet regime, it was seen as ‘antisocial’ 
and as a way of ‘cheating the system’, thus carrying amoral connotations (Ledeneva 1998). It 
was therefore easily manipulated towards opportunistic activities focused exclusively on 
personal gain (Hsu 2005). Secondly, since blat has operated by utilizing strong ties, those 
individuals closest to individuals with power i.e. the elite, are able to benefit more than less 
well-connected individuals. Thus blat networks functioning in the new Russian free-market 
context have supported personal and group benefits based on strong ties, with 
disproportionate gain for elite groups.  This has serious implications for entrepreneurship 
development in Russia since it suggests that, given the current strong-tie based network 
system, only the individuals in the inner circle of the elite can successfully utilize networked 
strategies for business formation. 
Studies in Russia have found evidence to support the importance of networks for 
business performance. Batjargal (2003) uses a social embeddedness approach to examine the 
impact of entrepreneurs’ social capital on their firm’s performance in Russia. Based on 
interviews conducted in 1995 and 1999, he finds that relational embeddedness (the quality of 
personal relations on economic actions) and resource embeddedness (networks allowing 
access and use of resources) have direct positive impacts on firm performance whereas 
structural embeddedness (the structure of the overall network of relations) has no direct 
impacts on performance (as measured by revenue and profit margin). Similarly, case study 
material supports the notion that having the right network connections facilitates business 
success in Russia whereas not having access to networks may make private businesses more 
vulnerable to rent-seeking officials (Kets de Vries and Florent-Treacy 2003). Aidis and 
Adachi (2005) find that networks between enterprises and officials are significant for 
business survival and growth, so new businesses without such connections are more likely to 
fail. Glasser (2004) and Djankov et al. (2006) find, in their comparative study of 
entrepreneurs in Russia and China, that social networks play a fundamental role in explaining 
entrepreneurship in both contexts. For example, they establish that in Russia, having a father 
who was a communist party member increases the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur:  
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even though the communist party has lost its pre-eminence, the informal networks it 
established remain powerful.  
However, surprisingly little work has been done on the influence of networks for 
business entry in Russia. The literature from developed economies highlights the importance 
of networks, especially weak ties for opportunity recognition and for obtaining access to 
resources needed to start-up a business.  Given the Russian context of weak institutions, poor 
regulatory enforcement, high levels of corruption and the lack of rule of law, the role of 
networks would seem of even greater importance at the start-up phase for business 
development. Yet, as Puffer and McCarthy have noted, ‘commitment and trust among 
network members in Eastern European business networks are typically low, the ties 
extremely weak, the network knowledge poor and participants few’ (2001: 32). Trust in the 
Russian business environment seems to develop only through repeated business interactions 
allowing little opportunities for newcomers to enter the market (Radaev 2005). Since trust in 
newcomers is low, one would expect existing entrepreneurs (i.e. entrepreneurial insiders) 
would have a greater advantage to extending their entrepreneurial activities vis-à-vis new 
entrepreneurs (entrepreneurial outsiders).
7 To summarize, we identify three distinct reasons, 
why ‘entrepreneurial insiders’ (those already in business) may have relatively more 
advantage over newcomers in starting new ventures in Russia (as compared with other 
countries). Namely: 
1.  Those without access to existing business networks are more vulnerable to 
opportunistic behavior of the extortion-seeking officials ( Kets de Vries and 
Florent-Treacy, 2003; Aidis and Adachi, 2005). 
2.  In the environment of weak formal enforcement of property rights, the latter is 
partly substituted by relational contracting enforcement via business networks 
(Johnson et al., 1999; McMillan and Woodruff, 2002). 
3.  Trust is a substitute for weak institutions. However, there is a low level of trust in  
Russian society, and it takes long time to establish it through repeated business 
interactions, therefore those already in business network have a significant 
advantage over newcomers (Radaev, 2005). 
 
This leads us to formulate our second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Those already embedded in entrepreneurial networks have a significant 
advantage in Russian firm start-ups. 
 
While the institutional context may differ considerably, there seems no reason to 
hypothesize that most of the characteristics favoring entrepreneurial activity in other 
economies would be systematically different in the Russian context. We therefore control in 
our regression analysis for many of these, subject to the limitations of the dataset in providing 
suitable proxies.  
Firstly, the literature notes the importance of individual factor supply characteristics.  
According to Reynolds et al. (2002) men are about twice as likely to be involved in 
entrepreneurial activities as women. Similarly, most research indicates that men have a higher 
probability of becoming entrepreneurs than women (Minniti et al. 2005; Verheul et al. 2006). 
Moreover, the likelihood of becoming self-employed varies with age. Relatively more 
business owners are in the 25 – 45 year old age category (Storey 1994; Reynolds et al. 1999) 
                                                 
7 One recent study contradicts these findings however: Chepurenko and Malieva (2005) provide some 
evidence that personal trust may be less important for Russian SMEs at start-up than previously thought.  
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and relatively more nascent business owners are even younger, between 25 – 34 years of age 
(Delmar and Davidsson 2000).
8 We control for age and gender in the regressions. 
Human capital is an important aspect of successful entrepreneurship, though the 
empirical findings for developed economies about the impact of human capital measured in 
terms of education on entrepreneurship are mixed. Thus, Robinson and Sexton (1994) and 
Cooper and Dunkelberg (1987) find that the decision to become self-employed is influenced 
by education while the results of Delmar and Davidsson (2000) and Davidsson and Honig 
(2003) show a clear education effect for nascent entrepreneurs.  However in a cross-country 
study, Uhlaner and Thurik (2005) find that a higher level of education is accompanied by 
lower rates of self-employment. Some country variations have also been noted. De Wit and 
van Winden (1989) and Blanchflower (2004) find that education is positively correlated with 
self-employment in the US but is negatively correlated in Europe. More recent evidence 
compiled by Parker (2005) suggests that on average, entrepreneurs tend to be more educated 
than non- entrepreneurs.  
The transition countries including Russia fare relatively well in terms of formal 
measures of education. Literacy rates are high and educational standards are comparable to 
Western Europe (see Estrin et al., 2006). Also, Russia has a high proportion of students in 
‘hard’ subjects - science, mathematics and engineering (see World Bank, 2005). Indeed the 
high levels of education are one of the main characteristics distinguishing Russia from most 
other emerging markets, which it resembles more closely in terms of institutional 
development. One might therefore expect that the relatively high proportion of educated 
people in the population, and especially those with advanced levels of technological training, 
would offset to some extent the unpromising institutional environment. There is some 
evidence already for this view: Barberis et al (1996), find that human capital was an 
important ingredient for successful new entry by small firms in Russia.  
Financial sectors are underdeveloped in transition economies. In such environment, 
trade credit (loans from firm to firm along the supply chain) substitute for bank credit and 
reinvestment of profits for outside equity. Strategies documented in the literature include 
engagement in trade and diversification of activities as a means of capital accumulation and 
hedging against risks (Smallbone and Welter 2001) and using network-based transactions to 
substitute for missing or costly markets (Stark 1996; Batjargal 2003). In an environment 
where outside financing is restricted, informal investors or business angels play an especially 
important role in providing financing for business start-ups. Former business angels who 
start-up their own private ventures may also signal individuals who have access to their own 
private sources of funding and we control for these in our empirical work.  
The hostile conditions under which entrepreneurs operate suggests that business 
owners will also exhibit skepticism towards the national government in terms of their ability 
and/or willingness to support (or simply not interfere with) private business development, 
though they may have great confidence in their own abilities. We control for entrepreneurial 
confidence in our regressions.  
 
5.  Data and empirical strategy 
 
            The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) generated the dataset we utilise in our 
empirical work. GEM is an ongoing multinational project created to investigate the incidence 
and causes of entrepreneurship within and between countries. Data are generated by surveys, 
which rely on stratified samples of at least 2,000 individuals per country. The dataset includes 
                                                 
8 As demographic structure of Russia, with a relatively low proportion of young people may be an additional 
obstacle to entrepreneurship, it is particularly important to control for age in our empirical tests.  
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a number of individual social and economic characteristics and perceptions. The key 
advantage of the GEM methodology is that the sample is drawn from the whole working age 
population in each country and therefore captures both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. 
While data on business ownership and individual business financing is included, 
entrepreneurial activity is primarily viewed as new, nascent start-up activity. More 
specifically, nascent entrepreneurs are defined as those individuals between the ages of 18 – 
64 years who have taken some action toward creating a new business in the past year. To 
qualify for this category, these individuals must also expect to own a share of the business 
they are starting and the business must not have paid any wages or salaries for more than 
three months (Minniti et al., 2005b). Established entrepreneurs are defined as individuals 
who own or manage a company and have paid wages or salaries for more than 42 months 
(ibid.). 
We use the GEM dataset for Russia collected in 2001 and 2002. In addition, for a 
comparative perspective we utilise all available data from the 2001-2005 surveys. Our survey 
database includes the following individual country samples (all have at least 2,000 
observations): Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, 
India, Ireland, Island, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States ( 2001), Slovenia (2001-
2005), Hungary (2001, 2002, 2004, 2005), Poland (2001 and 2002), Spain (2001 and 2004), 
Australia (2001 and 2005), Latvia (2005). 2001 survey results are publicly available and were 
accessed online; we merged these with  surveys results from 2002-2005, which were made 
available to us by the GEM team. We do not utilise 1999 and 2000 results, as these contain a 
smaller number of countries, which are all included in the 2001 round, so add little to the 
institutional variation in which we are interested. In addition, they cover a smaller number of 
variables. All individual level control variables are taken directly from the GEM database. 
Table 2 provides some characteristics of the data used. 
 
 
Table 2. General characteristics of the cross-country sample 
 
Variables Definition  Mean  SD  Number  of 
observations 
Institutional variables 
   
 
 
Corruption perceptions index (Transparency 
International); higher score represents less 
corruption (i.e. better institutions) 
6.43 1.97 104,112 
Legal Origin variables 
   
English*  1 = English legal origin, zero otherwise.  .29  .45  104,112 
French*  1 = French legal origin, zero otherwise.  .25  .43  104,112 
German*  1 = German legal origin, zero otherwise  .11  .31  104,112 
Scandin*  1 = Scandinavian legal origin, zero otherwise  .07  .25  104,112 
Socialist*  Socialist legal origin**, zero otherwise.   .29  .45  104,112 
Economic Development 
   
  GDP per capita, purchasing power  
parity,  constant at 2000 $ USD***. 2005 figures  
are estimates based on 2005 real GDP growth rates 
♦  
and 2005 population figures
♠.  
20,209 7892,0 104,112  
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Personal characteristics 
   
Male  1=  male, zero otherwise.  .48  .50  104,112 
Business owner  1= current owner/manger of business, zero 
otherwise. 
.10 .30 104,112 
Business angel 
 
1 = business angel in past three years, zero 
otherwise. 
.02 .15 103,546 
Knows 
entrepreneur(s) 
1 = personally knows entrepreneur(s) in past two 
years, zero otherwise. 
.33 .47 97,443 
In employment 
 
1 = respondent is either in full time or part time 
employment, zero otherwise. 
.51 .50 98,685 
Low education 
 
1 = respondent has not a post secondary or higher 
educational attainment, zero otherwise.  
.62 .48 98,906 
Young (<45)  1 = the exact age of the respondent at time of the 
interview is less than 45 
.56 .50 100,110 
 
We utilize the whole dataset to test hypotheses 1a and 1b, to explore whether the rate 
of entrepreneurial start up in Russia is systematically different from that in other countries 
when we control for the standard determinants e.g. gender, education and age. For hypothesis 
2, we need to investigate if the way some of these personal characteristics affecting 
entrepreneurship differ between Russia and the other countries. Our empirical strategy for 
this is to compare Russia with two other economies. The first is Brazil. It is the country in our 
sample that is closest to Russia in its level of GDP per capita which, as documented in 
empirical literature, is significantly (and negatively) linked to the level of entrepreneurship 
(Parker, 2004). Because of the similar level of GDP, and also because it is also a relatively 
large country, the Russia – Brazil comparison has been discussed in the past, notably by 
Shleifer and Treisman (2005). However, while Russia and Brazil are similar in many 
respects, they differ in terms of institutional quality, with Brazil characterized by significantly 
lower levels of corruption.
9 
Our second comparator is Poland, a country that is also similar to Russia in terms of 
income per capita, but unlike Brazil shares with Russia the institutional past of a command 
economy system. While considerably smaller than Russia, the Polish economy is the second 
largest in the post-communist group. In addition, its common history with Russia goes far 
beyond the Soviet period. Between 1831 and 1915, most of Poland shared Tzarist institutions 
with Russia, the impact of which is still detectable. The contrast between a similar heritage 
and the different paths of post-socialist transition have made the Russia-Poland comparison 
common in the transition literature (Mickiewicz, 2006). A comparison of macro level 
indicators, and the mean values and standard deviations for all the main independent 
variables employed in our empirical work for the three countries is reported in Table 3. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Shleifer and Treisman (2005) quote a United Nations survey on urban corruption to claim that the level of 
corruption is lower in Russia than in Brazil. In our comparison of corruption level, we rely on Transparency 
International (TI), which defines corruption as “the misuse of public power for private benefit, for example 
bribing of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, or embezzlement of public funds” (Lambsdorff, 
2005: 4). Transparency International index relies on methodology, which combines information from ten 
different surveys of corruption, where a score for any country is included only when there is an overlapping 
assessment of a country at least by three independent surveys. For that reason, while not entirely without 
methodological problems, TI index is the most reliable and widely used. We have more confidence in it than in 
the source quoted by Shleifer and Treisman. Moreover, recent data from the BEEPS survey, discussed in 
Kauffman et al. (2005), as quoted above, demonstrate that Russia continues to lag behind in terms of several 
measures of institutional quality, indicating that the assessment by Shleifer and Treisman may be overoptimistic. 
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Table 3. General characteristics of the Russian, Polish and Brazilian samples 
 
Variables Definition  Russia  Poland  Brazil 
Institutional variables 
   
 
 
Corruption perceptions index (Transparency 
International); higher score represents less 
corruption (i.e. better institutions) (2001) 
2.3 4.1 4.0 
Economic Development 
   
  GDP per capita, purchasing power parity,  constant 
at 2000 $ USD***. 2005 figures are estimates based 
on 2005 real GDP growth rates 
♦ and 2005 
population figures
♠.  
7,383 10,600  7,423 
Entrepreneurial activity 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Start-up  1= the respondent has been active in starting a new 
business in the past year, zero otherwise (this 
corresponds to ‘nascent entrepreneurship’ in GEM 
terminology) 
.035 
(.183) 
.030 
(.171) 
.097 
(.295) 
Business owner  1= current owner/manger of business, zero 
otherwise. 
.048 
(.213) 
.072 
(.258) 
.083 
(.275) 
Personal characteristics 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Male  1=  male, zero otherwise.  .475 
(.499) 
.491 
(.500) 
.594 
(.491) 
Young (<45)  1 = the exact age of the respondent at time of the 
interview is less than 45 
.599 
(.490) 
.520 
(.500) 
.705 
(.456) 
Low education 
 
1 = respondent has not a post secondary or higher 
educational attainment, zero otherwise.  
.194 
(.395) 
.241 
(.428) 
.905 
(.294) 
Family optimism  
 
 1 = Family financial situation will improve in the 
next 12 months, zero otherwise. 
.398 
(.490) 
.198 
(.398) 
.544 
(.498) 
Country optimism  1 = Country financial situation will improve in the 
next 12 months, zero otherwise. 
 
.398 
(.490) 
.115 
(.319) 
.319 
(.466) 
Business angel 
 
1 = business angel in past three years, zero 
otherwise. 
.021 
(.143) 
.014 
(.117) 
.008 
(.089) 
Knows 
entrepreneur(s) 
 
1 = personally knows entrepreneur(s) in past two 
years, zero otherwise. 
.333 
(.471) 
.300 
(.458) 
.347 
(.476) 
In employment 
 
1 = respondent is either in full time or part time 
employment, zero otherwise. 
.607 
(.488) 
.464 
(.499) 
.579 
(.494) 
Prev. shut down  1 = shut down business in past three years  .008 
(.087) 
.007 
(.084) 
 
Number of 
observations 
  4202 4000 2000 
 
Notes:  
For Poland and Russia, the mean and standard deviations values relate to pooled 2001-2002 sample. For Brazil, 
the 2002 sample was not available at time of writing, thus the values relate to 2001.  
There are three exceptions: the two variables measuring optimism and the indicator of previous shut 
down were available for one year only, for Poland and Russia. In addition, the information on previous 
shut down was not available for Brazil. 
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6. Empirical Findings 
 
In this section, we test the two hypotheses developed in the second section. We first 
address the two parts of Hypothesis 1, using information about the rate of formation of new 
firms in Russia in comparative perspective using the cross-country sample. Next we address 
hypothesis 2 by exploring the differences in characteristics between individuals undertaking 
various forms of entrepreneurial activity, comparing Russia, Poland and Brazil.  
After a catastrophic period of macro-economic performance subsequent to transition 
from communism, the Russian economy had begun to recover during the mid-1990s, only to 
suffer a major slump following the financial crisis in 1998 (EBRD, 2002). However, the 
devaluation at that time, and subsequent increases in the price of oil and other raw materials 
inaugurated a long period of relatively fast growth in Russia, from 1999, which has been 
maintained until this day. The macro-economic environment was therefore relatively benign 
for new firm creation during most of this period, including in 2001 and 2002, which were the 
dates of the GEM surveys we utilize. 
 
 
6.1 Specification of Equations  
 
We test Hypothesis 1 by exploring how the levels of entrepreneurial activity, proxied 
by new firm startup, varies across countries and legal arrangements, in an equation which 
also controls for the characteristics of entrepreneurs in each country. Thus in Table 4 we 
report four probit estimations, where we regress the startup dummy on  a variety of 
specifications of country level dummies augmented by the available individual characteristics 
of potential entrepreneurs. These characteristics include personal characteristics such as age, 
gender, education, employment status as well as proxies for financial characteristics and 
networks. This design enables us to control for underlying differences in country populations 
than can affect probability of the entrepreneurial entry and focus on the residual cross-
country differences, which can be largely attributed to the institutional environment. 
Specification (1) in Table 4 offers the simplest test of Hypothesis 1b, where we 
introduce just one single dummy representing the Russian sample, to test whether Russian 
entrepreneurial entry rates are significantly lower than anywhere else.  In specification (2) we 
add legal origin dummies, which include the socialist origin. A negative significant 
coefficient on the socialist origin dummy would provide support for Hypothesis 1a. We also 
include independently a Russian dummy variable to represent the incremental country 
specific difference in entrepreneurial entry, once we control for the joint effect for the post-
Soviet economic legacy, to test Hypothesis 1b.  We can also test Hypotheses 1a and 1b in 
specification (3), which is identical to specification (2) except that we control explicitly for 
Brazil to investigate whether it displays any of the characteristics of Russia with respect to 
entrepreneurship. Finally, in specification (4) we replace the socialist (Soviet) legal origin 
dummy with a set of country dummies, so as to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b for each available 
transition economy separately.    14
Table 4. Probit regression results. Dependent variable: Start-up           
                                           
     (1)      (2)       (3)        (4) 
   Coef.     Std. Err.    Coef.     Std. Err.     Coef.     Std. Err.    Coef.     Std. Err. 
Male      0.155 ***  0.013 0.155***  0.014  0.149 ***  0.014  0.149***  0.014
Business owner      0.619 ***  0.017 0.620***  0.017  0.624 ***  0.017  0.624***  0.017
Business angel      0.656 ***  0.029 0.646***  0.029  0.652 ***  0.029  0.652***  0.029
Knows entrepreneur(s)      0.444 ***  0.014 0.475*** 0.014  0.473  ***  0.014  0.471***  0.014
In employment      0.182 ***  0.014 0.177*** 0.014  0.170  ***  0.014  0.172***  0.014
Low education    -0.184 ***  0.013 -0.144***  0.014  -0.169 ***  0.014  -0.165***  0.014
Young (<45)     0.223 ***  0.014 0.225*** 0.014  0.219  ***  0.014  0.219***  0.014
Russia     -0.561 ***  0.068 -0.353***  0.070  -0.354 ***  0.070  -0.747***  0.069
French             -0.209***  0.017  -0.264 ***  0.018  -0.264***  0.018
German             -0.220***  0.022  -0.218 ***  0.022  -0.218***  0.022
Scandin             -0.390***  0.028  -0.392 ***  0.028  -0.391***  0.028
Socialist          -0.400***  0.019  -0.393 ***  0.019     
Latvia                               -0.332***  0.058
Poland                               -0.388***  0.039
Hungary                              -0.462***  0.029
Slovenia                             -0.342***  0.028
Brazil                       0.445 ***  0.040  0.443***  0.040
Constant     -1.936 ***  0.017  -1.786***  0.019   -1.762 ***  0.0194   -1.764***  0.019
Log likelihood   -21708       -21435       -21377        -21371 
Number of observations  87929 ***    87929***       87929 ***       87929 
LR chi
2  5817      6361       6477        6489*** 
Pseudo R
2  0.118         0.129         0.132          0.132  
Tests for linear restrictions (based on specification (4)), rejecting Ho - Russia the same as:     
   Chi
2       Chi
2                
Latvia 21.84  ***  French  legal  origin  48.00  ***               
Poland  21.48 *** German legal origin 55.99  ***               
Hungary  15.19 *** Scandin. legal origin23.75  ***               
Slovenia 31.08  ***                       
Brazil 223.85  ***                         15
To test Hypothesis 2, we estimate a series of probit models that explore the 
differences in characteristics between the individuals involved in either active start-ups or 
having established new firms and those of the population as a whole. In each case, we run the 
same models for Russia, Poland and Brazil and focus on differences in estimated coefficients 
between the three countries. We first estimate the equations for the pooled 2001-2002 
samples, controlling for annual effects, and next run single year comparisons which enable us 
to check which effects are time invariant and to introduce some variables that were not 
available for both years. We estimate equations of the form: 
        
The probability of being an entrepreneur/business owner =f (Network position, Personal 
characteristics, Financial characteristics, Personal attitudes). 
 
The two dependent variables measure different aspects of entrepreneurial activity in 
terms of start-ups and business-owners. All the variables used are defined in table 3. 
Hypothesis 2 is based on the argument that the Russian business environment relies 
disproportionately on networks and informal contacts, and this is likely to affect 
entrepreneurial activity. We have two variables related to the network position of the 
potential entrepreneur. First, for new business startup, we use an indicator for the current 
business owner. It has been noted that entrepreneurs in Russia often already have 
entrepreneurial experience, which may be of particular significance in the Russian business 
environment because of the need for networks. Second, we have an indicator for personal 
knowledge of other entrepreneurs (we do not use this variable in our models for established 
new firms, to avoid endogeneity problems).  
The dataset contains a number of the variables controlling personal characteristics 
already used in the literature, such as gender, age, human capital (educational attainment) and 
employment status. For the 2001 sample we also have two measures of ‘optimism’, one 
related to the respondent’s view of his or her own situation (‘financial situation will improve 
in the next twelve months’) and the other to the business environment (‘Russia’s financial 
situation will improve in the next twelve months’). However, we are unable to control for the 
possible endogeneity of household income and income from entrepreneurial activities, and 
we therefore choose to report regressions which omit household income
10. Our proxy for 
financial resources is a dummy variable that denotes previous provision of funds for 
businesses (business angels).  
For 2002 samples we have an indicator businesses that have shut down  in the last 
three years. The relevance of this last variable relate to the fact that failed entry leads to more 
realistic assessment of business environment. If failed entrepreneurs do not try again, it may 
imply the business environment remains hostile to entrepreneurship. 
Finally Russia is diverse regionally and though the sampling procedure concentrated 
on a few oblasts only, we controlled further for regional heterogeneity by including regional 
dummy variables. However, it turned out that given our model specifications, the regional 
heterogeneity is already well captured via individual level characteristics, and the set of 
regional dummies we applied turned out to be jointly highly insignificant. Accordingly, and 
to make the specifications compatible with the Polish and Brazilian samples (for which 
regional controls were not available), we omit the regional dummies. The results are not 
affected by this omission, apart from personal optimism, where inclusion of regional 
dummies seems to induce a multicollinearity problem resulting in lower significance 
(alternative specifications available on request). 
  
                                                 
10 Inclusion of household income does not affect the conclusions with respect to the hypotheses.  
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6.2 Rates of Entrepreneurship in Russia, Socialist Economies and Developed 
Economies 
 
The results are reported in table 4. The independent variables are all highly 
significant, as are the regressions with the pseudo-R
2 ranging from 0.118 in specification (1), 
with the least country specific controls, to 0.132 in specifications (3) and (4). We find support 
for Hypothesis 1b in all four specifications, in that the estimated coefficient on the Russia 
dummy variable is always negative and significant at the 99% level. The most convincing 
result in this respect is in specifications (2) and (4), which simultaneously test hypotheses 1a 
and 1b.  We find that the socialist heritage has indeed led to lower start up rates in all the 
post-communist countries, whether we take them as a group (specification (2)) or separately 
(specification (4)), which confirms Hypothesis 1a, but even then the Russia dummy is 
independently significant, supporting Hypothesis 1b. Thus, when we control for national 
differences in the characteristics of entrepreneurs, we find post-Soviet economies to be 
characterized by significantly lower entrepreneurial entry rates (as compared with English 
origin countries taken as benchmark), and even then there is an additional, significant 
negative effect for Russia. However, specifications  (1)-(4) compare country effects with the 
benchmark English legal origin group so it might be argued that the significance of the 
Russian dummy coefficients does not strictly establish  that Russia is different from other 
legal origin groups and individual countries. A more exact test is to impose pair-wise linear 
restrictions on corresponding coefficients. We report these at the bottom of Table 5. Russia is 
found to be different from all other legal origin groups, as well as from all other post-Soviet 
economies and Brazil, once again confirming the two hypotheses. While all differences are 
highly significant, one may note that the difference between Russia and Brazil is stronger 
than the difference between Russia and other post-communist economies (for the former, the 
corresponding chi
2 equals 224, while for the latter it remains in the range of 15-31). Clearly, 
post-Soviet countries share the anti-entrepreneurial legacy of the past. However, unlike 
Russia (and other CIS economies) the economies of Central Europe have already come some 
way in overcoming it. 
 
  6.3 Testing the importance of the embeddedness in entrepreneurial networks 
 
The findings of our regressions, for ‘active startups’ and ‘created new firms’, are reported in 
Table 5-8. We run the same models for Russia, Brazil and Poland in each specification, using 
probit methods to compare the characteristics of this involved in entrepreneurial activity with 
those in the population as a whole. The results for active startups are reported in Tables 6-8 
and those for established new firms in Table 8. The pooled samples for 2001 and 2002 are 
reported in Tables 5 and 8, and the single year comparisons for startups only in Tables 6 and 
7.  
The tables taken together contain several important findings that we take as evidence 
confirming our Hypothesis 2. The first is that the Russian startup regressions produce a much 
better fit than the Polish and Brazilian ones (Tables 5-7). For the Russian samples, the pseudo 
R Square for the active startup equations range from 32%-38%, while it remains between 
14% and 16% for the Polish sample and 8%-9% for the Brazilian sample. Arguably, a less 
random pattern of entrepreneurship may itself be taken as a rough indicator of some rigidity 
in entry. Clearly, some well-identified individual characteristics prevent some people from 
becoming entrepreneurs in Russia, while that same phenomenon is less likely to occur in 
Poland and even less so in Brazil. 
The most significant and robust result confirming Hypothesis 2 relates to the 
phenomenon of ‘insider entrepreneurship’ in Russia. While in Brazil and Poland, the  
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probability of new startup is not related to the current business ownership, in Russia, those 
who are not current business owners are far less likely to start new firms. The same result is 
obtained consistently when we move from pooled samples to annual samples and when we 
vary the specifications. That strongly suggests network effects. In addition, knowing other 
entrepreneurs is also more important in Russia than it is in the two other economies, though 
the positive impact on startup probability is significant in all three countries. 
In Poland, failed entrepreneurs who have shut down their businesses in the past three 
years are very likely to try again. No such significant effect can be detected in Russia (we do 
not have this variable for Brazil). The phenomenon of ‘serial entrepreneurship’ naturally 
follows from the fact that even failed project result in some enhancement in ‘entrepreneurial 
capital’ and the corresponding experience may prove useful enhancing the chances of success 
and implying that the individual has incentives to enter the entrepreneurial sector again. This 
argument should hold, unless the experience collected in the previous entrepreneurial entry is 
negative and points to some strong barriers in the business environment difficult to overcome 
to the ‘entrepreneurial outsider’. 
In addition, a few other results merit discussion. Entrepreneurial entry in Russia is 
less likely for individuals with lower level of education, the effect  is less strong in Poland 
and absent in Brazil. This implies some higher relative advantage associated with education 
in Russia. This could relate to the relatively high quality of education in Russia and the strong 
scientific educational base. However, that does not explain the difference between Russia and 
Poland, as the relative quality of education in the latter economy is similar. A more likely 
explanation therefore is that higher education is a proxy for another network effect. It is 
reasonable to expect that people with higher level of educational attainment are more likely to 
have better contacts with the state administration and other key players in the local business 
environment, enhancing their entrepreneurial opportunities. From the policy perspective the 
result is worrisome as low education is also closely correlated with poverty and low-income 
level.  
Our results indicate that, as in Western countries, respondents engaged in active start-
ups are more likely to be male. However, this effect is stronger for Russia than for both 
Poland and Brazil – it is insignificant for the two latter countries.  
According to our findings, young people in Poland and Brazil are more likely to be involved 
in startups, while the same effect is insignificant for Russia and the sign of the coefficient is 
ambiguous (Table 5). Again, this pattern may be consistent with the network  (insiders-
outsiders) argument. It is likely that older people in Russia may have a strong advantage in 
terms of networks and contacts with state bureaucracy that may facilitate start-ups. 
The findings on existing businesses differ from the pattern related to start-up just 
discussed. Interestingly, unlike startups, in Russia young people (i.e. below 45 years of age) 
are more likely to run established businesses than in Poland and Brazil (Table 9). This 
apparent contradiction may be explained once we take into account that age may mask some 
cohort effects. In Russia, the phenomenon of private entrepreneurship was about nine-ten 
years old at time of sampling. In contrast no Soviet-type restrictions ever existed in Brazil 
and there were also significantly weaker in Poland during the Soviet period. Assuming that 
many people tend to remain in the entrepreneurial sector, the time pattern of economic 
liberalization implies we would find more young existing entrepreneurs in Russia at time of 
sampling.  
With respect to personal optimism, and attitudes towards the Russian business 
environment, the impact on entrepreneurship is similar in the three countries. For respondents 
who have actually managed to create a new firm, we identify a positive impact from personal 
optimism. These results are in line with the findings of Puffer and McCarthy (2001) in Russia 
and the preliminary findings of Djankov et al. 2006 as well as the general findings of the  
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relationship between optimism and the propensity to become an entrepreneur (Parker 2004; 
Parker 2006). On the other hand, a positive attitude to the future of an economy as a whole is 
still not significantly associated with entrepreneurial activity for any of the three county 
samples. Thus in all these countries, personal optimism may play a positive role in converting 
aspirations to reality for entrepreneurs. One should note however a potential endogeneity 
(simultaneity) problem with this variable.  However, entrepreneurs do not have any 
systematically different perception about the future business prospects of Russia to the rest of 
the population. If anything, in both Poland and Russia, they are more pessimistic about the 
economic future of their countries, which would suggest the importance of the push factors, 
however the coefficients are marginally insignificant. 
 
Table 5. Probit regression results. Dependent variable: Start-up      
                 
   Russia 2001-2  Poland 2001-2  Brazil 2001 
   Coef.     Std. Err.  Coef.     Std. Err.  Coef.     Std. Err. 
Business owner    1.387474*** 0.120324 0.084815   0.141075 -0.12915    0.138707
Male    0.2480449*  0.099847 0.137701  0.088179 0.116791   0.092142
Young (<45)    0.1490918  0.114749 0.303244**  0.097855 0.184389 +  0.10221
Low education  -0.3702584*  0.169547 -0.25709+  0.137019 0.027486   0.161244
Business angel    0.605582*** 0.164882 0.954118*** 0.201614 0.712165 *  0.338407
Knows entrepreneur(s)     0.882158*** 0.112351 0.70103*** 0.090829 0.486311 ***  0.083212
In employment   0.0843237  0.11526 -0.00332  0.094367 0.50725 ***  0.098655
Year 2001 dummy    0.3670117*** 0.1064230.17169  +  0.088928       
Constant   -3.090432*** 0.168593 -2.57757*** 0.123806 -2.09694 ***  0.171836
Log likelihood  -392.29494      -465.367      -581.928      
Number of observations  4096     3982     1999     
LR chi2  415.77***    146.1***    105.24 ***    
Pseudo R2  0.3464      0.1357      0.0829      
 
 
Table 6 Probit regression results. Dependent variable: Start-up      
                  
   Russia 2001  Poland 2001  Brazil 2001 
   Coef.    
Std. 
Err. Coef.     
Std. 
Err. Coef.     
Std. 
Err. 
Business owner  1.203*** 0.170 -0.011  0.200 -0.135   0.140
Male    0.236  0.151 0.194  0.124 0.109   0.093
Young (<45)  -0.084  0.170 0.131  0.138 0.147   0.104
Low education   -0.531*  0.258 -0.088  0.166 0.016   0.162
Personally optimistic    0.462**  0.168 0.522*** 0.140 0.219 *  0.088
Optimistic about the economy  -0.114 0.156 -0.145 0.178 0.141    0.088
Business angel    0.728**  0.239 0.957*** 0.252 0.734 *  0.343
Knows entrepreneur(s)   0.800*** 0.178 0.619*** 0.131 0.482 ***  0.084
In employment    0.448*  0.197 -0.061 0.132 0.508  ***  0.099
Constant   -2.951*** 0.262 -2.380*** 0.160 -2.231 ***  0.178
Log likelihood  -184.999     -245.153       -576.160     
Number of observations  1302.000     1701.000     1999.000     
LR chi
2  175.410***    87.130***    116.770 ***    
Pseudo R
2   0.322      0.151      0.092      
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Table 7. Probit regression results. Dependent variable: Start-up 
   Russia 2002  Poland 2002 
   Coef.     Std. Err.  Coef.     Std. Err. 
Business owner    1.425 *** 0.269 0.275   0.223
Male     0.301   0.199 0.153  0.141
Young (<45)     0.327   0.235 0.564*** 0.165
Business angel    1.270 *** 0.368 0.422  0.483
Knows entrepreneur(s)    0.977 *** 0.241 0.766*** 0.144
In employment   -0.282   0.210 -0.003  0.148
Prev. shut down    0.316   0.495 1.271**  0.424
Constant -3.141  *** 0.316 -2.879*** 0.194
Log likelihood  -95.947      -181.467    
Number of obs  1698      1980    
LR chi
2  117.74 ***    66.61***   
Pseudo R
2  0.380       0.155     
Note: Educational dummy for Russia eliminated during the estimation, as it completely determines the 
outcome for this particular model. 
 
 
Table 8. Probit regression results. Dependent variable: Business owner 
   Russia 2001-2  Poland 2001-2  Brazil 2001 
   Coef.     Std. Err.Coef.     Std. Err.Coef.     Std. Err. 
Male   0.221 **  0.082 0.177** 0.069 0.072   0.101 
Young (<45)   0.363 ***  0.097 -0.294*** 0.071 -0.134  0.103 
Low education   -0.359 **  0.131 -0.465*** 0.114 0.043  0.172 
Business angel    1.664 ***  0.146 1.286*** 0.183 1.007** 0.351 
In employment    0.641 ***  0.114 1.244*** 0.095 1.380*** 0.161 
Year 2001 dummy  0.565 ***  0.0900.233  *** 0.069       
Constant   -3.023 ***  0.148 -2.348*** 0.103 -2.476*** 0.216 
Log likelihood  -557.916      -834.443     -493.660    
Number of observations  4116      3989     1999    
LR chi
2  294.280 ***    394.610***   151.840***  
Pseudo R
2  0.209       0.191      0.133     
 
 
 
7. Implications and Future Directions: The importance of networks in weak 
institutional environments 
 
There are two distinctive feature of networking in the Russian economy. First, the 
scale of the phenomenon is much wider. Networks do not complement the markets (to create 
synergies) but often substitute them, creating significant transaction costs. Second, the nature 
of the networking differs. Russia is characterized by an intrusive and hostile business 
environment, in which contacts with both other existing businesses and state administration 
play a decisive role in networking. Much of the networking activity is not in the 
efficiency/real productivity-enhancing sphere but in the form of unproductive activities in the 
‘control’ sphere. In the context of previous discussion however, it is likely that in Russia, 
association with the business-government web of interests and connections is a more 
fundamental aspect of networking. The above discussion as well as our empirical results 
indicates the need for developing a new direction for research in contexts such as Russia 
where the institutional environment is weak and property rights are poorly enforced.  
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Our results suggest that the negative environment for business, and especially 
entrepreneurial activity, in Russia has led to low levels of entrepreneurship. Moreover, 
drawing on a sample that allows us to compare the characteristics of entrepreneurs in Russia 
with those of the rest of the population, we find that the relatively few who undertake some 
form of entrepreneurial activity in Russia are different in several interesting ways from their 
counterparts in more business friendly environments; they are relatively more likely to be old, 
male and educated than in comparator countries.  
More importantly, the lack of effective and extensive networks seems to play a critical 
role in inhibiting entrepreneurship development in Russia. Our results indicate that those who 
are already in the business sector, more than in other countries, dominate entrepreneurial 
entry in Russia. Knowing other entrepreneurs also plays more important role in Russia, and 
previous failed entrepreneurial attempt is not significantly associated with ‘serial 
entrepreneurship’ unlike the comparator countries. ‘Entrepreneurial outsiders’ who attempted 
to break into the web of business- and government administration- connections and failed are 
less likely to try again in Russia. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature by further exploring the influence of 
combination of weak institutions and corresponding network structures on entrepreneurial 
development. Our results indicate that in the case of Russia, this combination is especially 
detrimental for entrepreneurial start-ups and development. Further research in this area is 
needed to pin down more carefully the relationship between institutional development and 
levels of entrepreneurial activity and how additional factors such as the presence and strength 
of informal networks may act as substitutes for dysfunctional institutions in a different way 
for business insiders and for the newcomers.  
Additional empirical work in transition countries and emerging economies on the 
effects of different levels of institutional development and types of network relations 
specifically focused on business entry using a comparative approach could also provide 
further insights into this important relationship. In  future surveys, it would be interesting to 
supplement the questions on contacts with other businessmen with questions on contacts with 
government officials.  
While we document the difference between Russia and other GEM countries available 
at the time of writing, it would be interesting to compare Russia with a larger number of post-
Soviet economies. For instance, preliminary evidence for Ukraine demonstrates, in line with 
our argument, that corruption may have a serious negative development on entrepreneurship 
(Akimova, 2001). 
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